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The recent revitalization of concemn  for environ-  and perhaps industrial flight and the develop-
mental quality has generated many questions  ment of pollution havens. The many empirical
about the interaction between trade and the  studies that have tried to test these hypotheses
environment, Most of these questions have to do  have shown no evidence to support them.
with the impact oi environmental regulaticn on
trade patterns and gains from trade. If a tradeoff  *  Countervailing duties or an intemational
is perceived, it is often argued that some inter-  enviromnental standard have no place here. Both
vention becomes appropriate: either a specific  concepts ignore the reallocation of resources that
trade policy or the establishment of an intema-  must occur if extemalities are to be efficiently
tional environmental standard.  incorporated into costs. They also ignore the fact
that standards should be based on local calcula-
Present GATT policy then becomes an issue  tions of marginal costs and benefits. Orly  if an
of debate. Should GAIT  revise its rules to  exporter's  standards are below what is locally
accommodate the specific trade measures  optimal would a countervailing duty be justified.
suggested? How can GAIT  ensure that the
environmental objective is not a disguise for a  e  Subsidies are likely to be trade barriers in
trade barrier? Should GATT establish some  disguise and should generally not be accommo-
international environmental standard with  dated. They are not usually an efficient means of
procedures to ensure compliance?  achieving an environmental objective and may
hinder the efficient allocation of resources away
The importance given to trade liberalization  from pollution-intensive industries.
and exchange rate policy reform as part of
adjustment for development has raised another  e  Imposing a tariff when pollution spills over
set of questions: Is there a direct link between  national boundaries can be no more than a
the removal of trade barriers and environmental  second-best policy. If the tariff is based on
degradation? If so, how should liberalization  damage to the victim country alone, it will not
strategies incorporate this cost? Should trade  reduce trade in the polluting product enough; if it
policy be used to meet environmental objectives?  maximizes the welfare of the victim, it may
reduce trade in the product too much.
Dean surveys the literature .n the main
questions being debated in botlh  of these areas.  * There seems to be a case for establishing
Among her conclusions:  some intemational code of product standards, to
prevent the use of such standards as nontariff
More stringent regulations in one country  barriers.
are thought to result in reduced competitiveness
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of energy, and demand for  food.  Under current practices, the result could be appalling
environmental conditions in  both urban and rural areas.  The World Development Report
presents an alternative, albeit more difficult, path - one that, if  taken, would allow future
generations to  witness improved environmental conditions accompanied by  rapid economic
development  and the virtual eradication  of widespread  poverty.  Choosing  this path will require
that both industrial and developing  countries seize the current moment  of opportunity  to reform
policies, institutions, and aid programs.  A two-fold strategy is reAiuired.
First, take  advantage  of the positive  links between  economic  efficiency,  income growth,
and protection of the environment. This calls for accelerating  programs for reducing  poverty,
removing  distortions that encourage  the economically  inefficient  and environmentally  damaging
use of natural resources, clarifying  property rights, expanding  programs for education  (especially
for girls), family  planning  services, sanitation  and clean  water, and agricultural  extension,  credit
and research.
* Second, break the negative links between economic activity and the environment.
Certain targeted measures, described in  the  Report, can bring dramatic improvements in
environmental  quality at modest  cost in investment  and economic  efficiency. To implement  them
will require overcoming the power of vested interests, building strong institutions, improving
knowledge,  encouraging  participatory  decisionmaking,  and building  a partnership  of cooperation
between industrial and developing  countries.
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The recent revitalization of  concern for environmental quality has generated many
questions  regarding the interaction  between  trade and the environment. Most of these questions
relate to the impact of environmental  regulations  on trade patterns and gains from trade.  If a
trade-off  is perceived, it is often argued  that some intervention  becomes  appropriate: either a
specific trade policy measure or the establishment  of an international  environmental  standard.
Present GATT policy then becomes an issue of debate.  Should GATT revise its rules to
accommodate the  specific trade  measures suggested?  How can  GATT ensure  that  the
environmental objective is not a  guise for a trade barrier?  Should GATT establish some
international  environmental  standard with procedures to ensure compliance?
The importance  given to trade liberalization  and exchange rate policy reform as part of
adjustment for development  has raised another set of questions. Is there a direct link between
removal of  trade barriers and environmental degradation?  If so, how should liberalization
strategies incorporate this cost?  Should  trade policy be used to meet environmental  objectives?
This paper surveys the existing literature on the major questions being debated in both
these areas.  The remainder of this section presents an overview  of the main points of debate.
Inter-Country  Differences  in Environmental  Regulation  of Production  Pollution
Will a country  with stricter environmental  regulations  regarding  production  of a good lose
comparative advantage in  that good?  Will  this lead to  relocation of  "dirty industries"--
particularly to  developing countries?  If  so,  should an international set of  environmental
regulations regarding production be established to  avoid  such a  shift in  trade  patterns?
Alternatively,  should GATT  allow countries  to apply countervailing  duties to lower cost imports
from  countries  with  more  lenient  restrictions?  Should  GATT  allow  subsidization of
environmental control costs  so that more strictly regulated firms do not lose comparative
advantage?  Are domestic subsidies to meet environmental  objectives allowable, or do they
generate an unfair advantage  in trade?
1Transnational  Pollution
Some production generates pollution which crosses national boundaries, e.g.,  acid rain.
Should  trade barriers be use-' to reduce the ILvel  of global emissions? Should trade barriers be
used  as a threat to coerce countries  to comply to an internationally  agreed upon emissions  target?
If so, how must GATT revise its rules to accommodate  this? Will different  abatement  strategies
imply large changes in trade patterns or the gains from trade?
Product Standards as Non-Tariff Earriers
Will a country with relatively strict standards  for product quality/safety  be perceived as
using that standard as a trade barrier?  Should GATT require its signatories to comply to an
international standard for products in order to eliminate the possibility of implicit barriers?
Would this not imply that countries  with relatively strict standards  would  be forced to lower their
standards to a global common denominator?
Trade in Hazardous Substances
Should countries be able to export domestically  prohibited goods, or goods which are
severely restricted in the home market?  Or, should the exporting countries' product standard
be imposed on the importing country?
Reform of Trade and Exchange Rate Policy: The Implications  for Natural Resource Use and
Environmental  Degradation
Will  devaluation of  currency and  removal of  trade  barriers encourage growth in
developing country export sectors at the cost of overuse of natural resources? I.e.,  will such
liberalization  encourage  a type  of development  which  is not sustainable?  Will forests be depleted
too rapidly? Will soil be depleted due to increased  production  or shifts to more environmentally
damaging crops?  If so, should trade policy reforms be revised to incorporate these costs?
2II.  ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATIKN  AND COMPARATIVE  ADVANTAGE
As long as damage to the environment  is not internalized  appropriately  into the costs of
production, a non-optimal  allocation of resources exists.  In an open economy, this means that
the pattern of trade is also likely to be non-optimal. How, then, should  trade patterns be altered
to reflect the opportunity  cost of environmental  damage?
In theoretical trade literature the environment  is most often treated as a "third" factor
of production (in addition to the standard labor and capital in the 2x2 model).  A country is
thought  to have an environmental  abundance  if it has a relatively  large assimilative  capacity--i.e.,
a relatively greater ability to tolerate (absorb) pollutants.  As Blackhurst (1977) points out,
assimilative capacity is influenced  not only by the physical ability of water, air, and land to
absorb waste, but by the level of pollutants the society is willing to tolerate.
Several studies  have analyzed  the theoretical  impact  of environmental  policy on standard
results in trade.  See,  for example, Siebert (1977, 1985), Pethig (1976), McGuire (1982),
Baumol  and Oates (1988), and Blackhurst (1977).  Siebert (1985) summarizes  the main results
of many  of these studies  regarding  the impact  of environmental  policy  on comparative  advantage.
Assuming  that countries  have identical  production,  pollution  and abatement  functions  for
a  particular good, then in free trade, one would expect the country with relatively larger
assimilative  capacity to specialize more in the pollution-intensive  good.  I.e., it is assumed that
in autarky, the country richly endowed with assimilative  capacity will have a price advantage
in the pollution-intensive  good. However, as long as the costs of pollution  are not internalized,
the price advantage is overstated. There is too much specialization  in this good.
Unilateral imposition  of environmental  regulations  by the environmentally  rich country
will impose environmental control costs (ECC) on its producers, thus eroding their price
advantage relative to the foreign country.  This will reduce the location disadvantage  of the
environmentally  scarce country.  We should, therefore, expect a shift in specialization,  where
the  environmentally scarce country increases production of  the pollution-intensive good.
3Unilateral regulations not only change the pattern of trade, but increase pollution in the other
country--even  when no transnational  pollution exists ("pollute thy neighbor via trade").
Siebert discusses unilateral policy only.  Suppose, however, that both countries adopt
optimal environmental regulation, such that production costs now include the true costs of
pollution.  Then, one  would expect world output of  the pollution-intensive  good to  fall.
However, one would still expect the environmentally  rich country to retain its comparative
advantage  in the production of the pollution-intensive  good.  Optimal regulation  of pollution  in
both countries should alter the pattern of trade to reflect the relative assimilative  capacities of
the trading  partners.  It is unclear, then, whether  unilateral  restrictions  move the pattern of trade
closer to the optimum pattern.
III.  THE IMPACT OF INTER-COUNTRY  DIFFERENCES  IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION  OF PRODUCTION  POLLUTION
From this brief summary  of the theoretical literature, there appears to be grounds for
concern that countries with more stringent environmental  regulations could experience loss in
comparative advantage  in affected sectors.  It is also clear that some shifting of resources out
of tlhe  pollution-intensive  sector is desirable, to the extent that present trade patterns do .,ot
accurately reflect relative assimilative capacities.  Part A examines the extent to which trade
patterns have been influenced  by inter-country  differences  in regulations. Part B examines the
degree to which whole industries have relocated to countries with more lenient regulations. In
particular, is  there evidence that developing countries are  becoming havens for pollution-
intensive industries? Finally, part C analyzes the appropriate policy response to these shifts in
comparative  advantage. Specifically,  should the attainment  of environmental  objectives  justify
the use of countervailing  duties, subsidies, or a harmonized  system of international  standards?
A.  Loss of Competitiveness
Numerous  studies have tried to estimate the impact  of ECC on industry price and output,
4and on the trade balance.  See for example:  D'Arge (1974), OECD (1978), Magee and Ford
(1972),  Pasurka (1985), Mutti and Richardson  (1976, 1977),  Walter (1973), Ugelow (1982), US
DOC (1975), Yezer and Philipson (1974), Chapman (1991), Robison (1988), Tobey (1990).
The methodologies  are quite varied, making comparisons  between studies difficult.  However,
some generalizations  can be drawn.  First, estimates  of total ECC by industry tend to b.  very
low--abatement  costs are a very small p  rtion of industry costs on average.  Second,  reductions
in output caused by ECC are also small and insignificant  on average, although they can be
significant  for some individual  sectors. Third, there is little evidence  of any significant  impact
of ECC on the pattern of trade.  This section will briefly review several early studies, and then
turn to two more recent works, Robison (1988) and Tobey (1990).
In one of the earliest studies, Walter (1973) investigates  the pollution content of US
trade.  If export goods are relatively pollution-intensive  compared to import goods, then US
environmental  regulations are likely to discourage the export sector.  Walter calculates direct
ECC and overall ECC (direct and indirect) for 83 goods and services in the US.  ECC is defined
to  include:  current R&D expenditure for compliance, depreciation on existing pollution
abatement  equipment, the capital cost of that equipment, and current operation costs associated
with environmental  management. The data are from the late 1960s; a 1966 I-0 table is used.
Average annual overall ECC for US exports is found to be 1.75% of the value of US
exports for 1968-70.  Since foreign ECC costs are unavailable, US import-competing  sectors'
ECC are used to calculate  the average  annual overall ECC of US imports.  This is 1.52% of the
value of US imports. Walter considers  this difference  insignificant,  and concludes  that ECC are
trade neutral at best and marginally damaging to US export industries at worst.  Weighting
overall ECC for an industry by its importance  in trade, Walter anticipates  that some individual
industries  might be vulnerable  to loss of competitiveness--e.g.,  construction  and mining, plastics.
No attempt is made to measure the magnitude  of such a loss, however.
Both the US DOC (1974' and Yezer and Philipson (1974) studies (as summarized  by
Ugelow (1982))  look at the effects  of ECC on output in a limited number  of industries. The US
DOC examined the impact of ECC for water pollution control on copper smelting, aluminum,
wood pulp, and phosphate  fertilizer. They concluded  that short-term  effects would  be more than
masked by other factors affecting the state of the economy.  No changes in trade patterns in
5these sectors were observed. Yezer and Philipson found that the percentage  decrease in output
attributable to ECC (direct and indirect) for 14 industrial sectors averaged less than 1  % (with
the exception of petrolcum).  Ugelow suggests that this underestimates  the impact on output,
since it only incluaes incremental  costs attributable to federal legislation.
The OECD (1978)  study also takes account  of inter-industry  linkages in calculating  ECC
effects on output in Japan, the Netherlands, Italy, and the US.  Ugelow summarizes  the overall
results as follows. The increase in prices due to ECC is not terribly significant,  but is sufficient
to trigger some reduction in output and exports.
Richardson and Mutii (1976) present a general equilibrium analysis.  They estimate
domestic and import market demand and supply equations for 81 industries, with varying
assumptions about domestic elasticity of  supply.  Again an input-output matrix is  used to
calculate both direct and indirect ECC.  The impact of these ECC on price and output is
evaluated  under three scenarios: the "polluter-pays-principle,  " full subsidization  of ECC through
a VAT; full subsidization  of ECC by a production tax.  The three methods of financing  do not
yield  significant differences in  outcomes overall.  However,  subsidization implies that
displacement  costs are spread more evenly across industries. With subsidization,  the range of
change in price and output is 1%-1.5% (rise and fall, respectively). Under the polluter-pays-
principle this range increases to up to 5  %.  The individual  industries  found most susceptibie  are:
livestock, chemicals, plastic, paints, petrol refining, non-ferrous metal manufacturing, and
utilities.
Richardson  and Mutti stress that one cannot assess the trade impact  of ECC until one can
account  for: inter-country  differences  in controls; financing  of controls;  inter-country  differences
in macro policy; and exchange rate flexibility.  Not surprisingly, in their 1977 stbdy, these
authors try to account for some of these other variables. Four schemata  for estimating effects
of unilateral  controls  are compared: a partial equiiibrium  approach  which calculates  direct ECC
only and uses elasticities to estimate output effects;  the use of 1-0 matrices to capture both
direct and indirect cost increases due to  environmental regulations;  a  "macro-orthodox"
approach which incorporates feedback  on industry  output through  changes in exchange rates, in
domestic income, in demand both at home and abroad due to exchange rate changes, and
assumes full pass-through  of ECC to prices; a "classical  general equilibrium"  approach  in which
6domestic elasticity of supply is not infinite, ECC is not fully passed through to prices, and
income and exchange  rate changes are not included.
A comparison of the first two approaches  reveals that the partial equilibrium method
tends to underestimate  output effects by 50% compared to approaches  which use 1-0 matrices
to account for inter-industry  linkages.  Inclusion  of general equilibrium  refinements, as in the
latter two approaches,  yields displacement  costs which  are 30% lower  and more smoothly  spread
across firms than those found in the second  approach (assuming  ECC are subsidized  by a VAT
tax). This suggests  that feedback  through  other economic  variables  tends to mitigate  the already
relatively small impact of ECC on industrial output.
Robison's work (1988) is important  for several reasons. First, it updates the study by
Walter (1973) on the pollution content of US trade.  Estimates  are made for 1973, 1977, and
1982, using 1-0 tables for 1973  and 1977. Secondly,  Robison presents estimates  of the impact
of a  1% increase in ECC on the trade balance.  He purposely does not include the general
equilibrium  refinements  discussed  by Richardson  and Mutti (1977), and purposely assumes full
pass-through  of ECC to prices.  In this way he hopes to generate upper-bound  estimates  of trade
impacts.
In calculating  the pollution  content of US trade, Robison  must again assume that US ECC
for import-competing  industries  are equivalent  to actual ECC for US imports.  Results indicate
that the ratio of abatement  content of US imports to US exports has risen from 1.151 to 1.389
between 1973 and 1982.  Robison concludes that US comparative  advantage  has shifted away
from goods which in the US have high abatement  costs. When the same calculation  is done for
US trade with Canada, Robison finds no change in this ratio.  He hypothesizes  that this might
be due to similar ECC in the two countries.
Robison constructs the following  hypothetical  scenario: an increase in abatement  costs
raises the sectoral price by 1  %.  For 78 sectors (both manufacturing  and non-manufacturing),
he calculates the impact on the  1977 sectoral trade balance of  this change in relative price
(including  both direct and indirect effects). The impacts  on total US sectoral  trade (value)  range
from -0.12% (special  industry machinery)  to -7.08% (copper) for merchandise  sectors, with an
average impact of -2.69%.  Omitting all mitigating  general equilibrium effects which might
come from exchange rate or income changes, the aggregate effect on the US trade balance is
calculated. It is not clear what method  of aggregation  is used here.  For 1977, the net reduction
7is 0.67% of the value of US total trade.  Robison argues that marginal changes in abatement
costs will affect .he US balance of trade.  However, his figures suggest that the impact would
be quite small overall.
Tobey (1990) takes a completely  different approach  to testing whether or not ECC have
any impact  on US comparative  advantage. Following  earlier work on shifting  patterns of trade
by Leamer (1984) and Bowen (1983), he employs a cross-section "Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek"
(HOV) model. Beginning  with 64  agricultural  and manufacturing  industries, Tobey calculates
the total ECC as a percentage of total costs of production. "Pollution-intensive"  industries  are
those whose ECC/TC exceeds 1.85%--24 industries.  Even for these industries, the range is
1.92%-2.89%.  These sectors are aggregated into five groups:  mining, primary nonferrous
metals, paper and pulp, primary iron and steel, and chemicals. For each of these five groups,
net exports are regressed on US endowments  of  11 resources (labor, land, capital, natural
resources).
in  this type of model, one would include a measure of environmental endowment, to
ascertain whether or not environmentally  rich countries export more of the pollution-intensive
good. Clearly, environmental  endowment  is difficult  to measure. Tobey, however, is interested
in the effect of ECC on trade patterns.  His first test, therefore, involves including  a dummy
variable for ECC stringency as an additional explanatory  variable.  Presumably, in an HOV
model of this type, Tobey is Implicitly  assuming that more stringent ECC are correlated with
environmental scarcity.  Thus the dummy variable should have a  negative coefficient.  In
addition to problems with measuring stringency, this taxonomy ignores the fact that countries
may be presently pursuing non-optimal  environmental  regulation.  In that case stringency is a
poor indicator of environmental  endowment. If the stringency  dummy  is correlated with ECC,
then this may still be a good test of whether relatively  high ECC tends to decrease net exports.
Tobey finds no significant  impact of stringency  of ECC on trade patterns.
Tobey's  second test is an omitted variable test.  If ECC do have an impact on net
exports, then countries with stringent regulations  (DCs) should have a negative expected sign
in the error term, while the opposite  is true for countries  with lenient  regulations (LDCs). The
null hypothesis is that there will be no difference in the expected signs of the error terms.
Tobey finds that the null hypothesis  cannot be rejected.
It has been suggested in a recent work by Chapman (1991) that ECC have been highly
8underestimated,  because, among other,  things,  they have not included workplace health and
safety protection costs.  There may be room for more work along the lines of Robison and
Tobey, but with better estimates  of the actual costs imposed on industries  due to environmental
regulation.  However, it is unclear that this would yield a significant  impact on trade patterns,
unless it implied radically larger ECC across all regulated  industries.
B.  Relocation  of Industry to "Pollution  Havens"
Another fear which has been voiced is that relatively low environmental standards in
developing countries compared to industrialized nations will lead "dirty" industries to shift
operations to these LDCs (the industrial flight hypothesis). In addition, LDCs may purposely
undervalue  the environment  in order to attract new investment  (the pollution  haven hypothesis).
Both phenomena  could lead to non-optimal  (excessive)  pollution in LDCs.
As has been argued above, some shift in the production of pollution-intensive  goods is
optimal, since countries possess different assimilative capacities to  absorb pollutants (i.e.,
different environmental  endowments). However, as Pearson (1987) points out, there is no a
priori reason to believe that increased output in the environmentally  abundant  country will be
captured by multinationals  as opposed to domestic firms.  There is also no a priori reason to
believe that LDCs are relatively environmentally  abundant  compared to DCs.
Pearson notes that empirical investigations  of this issue must contend with the following
difficulties:  there is no  unambiguous definition of ECC;  any observed change in FDI  is
influenced  by many other economic variables other than ECC; no good data on foreign ECC
exist, rendering it impossible  to really calculate the impact of differentials  in ECC.
Walter (1982) looks at trends in foreign direct investment  by firms from W. Europe,
Japan, and the US from approximately  1970 to 1978. He examines  trends in FDI both in terms
of industry mix and destination. Although  there exists a large amount of overseas production
in pollution-intensive  industries, there is little evidence that it has been influenced  by differing
ECC.  Examination  of trends in foreign FDI into the US also supports this conclusion. There
is no evidence that foreign FDI is shifting  towards states with more lenient standards.
Pearson (1987) surveys several studies, all of which tend to support the conclusion that
there is little evidence of industrial flight to developing  countries.  Results from three of these
are discussed below.  Pearson (1976) estimates the increase in exports in  18 manufacturing
9sectors which LDCs might expect to gain as a result of differentials  in ECC.  That is, what are
the potential  gains from maintvining  lower  environmental  standards? His results for 1973-77  and
1978-82 indicate that LDCs might see an increase over existing levels of export revenues of
between 2.1% and 4.6%.  He considers  this small relative to the 8% annual  growth which took
place during the period.
Duerksen and Leonard (1980) examine trade and investment  data to determine if ECC
differentials  have led to industrial flight toward LDCs.  Among  their results are:  host countries
which received  the most overseas  investment  in pollution-intensive  chemicals,  paper, metals, and
petroleum refining were other industrial countries (not LDCs); the percent of  US FDI in
pollution-intensive  industries  in LDCs compared  to DCs did not increase  significantly  over time.
They conclude that there is no evidence of widespread  relocation of US industries  to pollution
havens.  A study by Knodgen (1979) of W. German FDI also supports this conclusion.
Leonard (1988) presents case studies of FDI in Ireland, Spain, Mexico, and Romania.
He argues that the industrial flight and pollution haven hypotheses  are based on too static an
idea of comparative  advantage. His approach  to the determination  of comparative  advantage  and
therefore industrial location incorporates  theoretical  work on:  the product cycle, the existence
of foreign  direct investment,  industrial  location  decisions  by firms, bargaining  processes  between
multinationals  and host countries,  and development  strategies. Examining  aggregate  trade and
investment statistics, Leonard sees no evidence of large-scale industrial flight as a response to
US environmental  regulations.  In the four countries studied, government  officials  appeared to
behave in conformance  with the pollution-haven  hypothesis  in the 1970s. However, the savings
realized from the absence of pollution  controls were not substantial  enough to alter the locational
preferences of  multinational firms.  Other factors, such as the level of  training of  labor,
infrastructure and stability were much more important in  location decisions.  In  addition,
growing concern by these countries for the environment  has influenced  the bargaining process
with multinationals. Leonard argues that these countries could not be called pollution havens
in any sense today.
C.  Policy Responses  to Loss of Competitiveness
In  1972, OECD countries agreed to  a  "polluter-pays-principle"  (PPP) regarding the
financing  of ECC.  Presumably  this was to facilitate  the efficient  allocation  of resources through
10internalizing negative externalities.  As argued above, this theoretically implies a  loss in
comparative  advantage in pollution-intensive  sectors for the country with relatively high ECC.
Empirically,  at least some  sectors may see significant  loss in competitiveness. One proposal has
been to subsidize  ECC so that industries  in countries with "high standards"  will not experience
this loss in comparative advantage.  (Despite the PPP scheme, OECD countries have indeed
implemented  numerous subsidies  to cover ECC.)  This would imply that GATT would need to
distinguish subsidies for  attainment of  environmental goals,  from other  subsidies which
ostensibly give firms an "unfair" advantage  in trade.
The study of Richardson  and Mutti (1977) provides some evidence on this issue.  They
compare the impact upon US industry output of ECC under the PPP and under a scheme where
ECC are subsidized. The subsidy  is paid for by levying an identical tax on the value-added  of
each industry.  In several of the models they consider, Richardson and Mutti find that the
subsidization scheme makes the distribution of  environmental control displacement across
industries  more equal, as compared to the PPP results. That is, the subsidy  scheme reduces the
relative disincentives  facing industries most severely impacted by ECC.
Government  subsidies  which compensate  firms for the cost of meeting  regulations  inhibit
the optimal shift of resources away from pollution-intensive  industries.  Thus, on the basis of
economic efficiency,  there does not seem to be any reason to allow the avoidance of loss of
comparative advantage through use of  subsidies to  meet ECC.  In addition, the economic
literature on pollution  has long argued  that tax schemes  or marketable  permits  are usually  a more
efficient method  of internalizing  pollution  costs than subsidies. This suggests  that subsidies  used
to attain environmental  goals are likely to be guises for avoiding  losses in competitiveness,  and
should not be allowed by GATT.
Another  popular  policy  proposal is to allow countries  to levy  countervailing  duties against
imported products whose cost advantage  is derived from relatively more lenient environmental
standards. Pearson (1987) argues that such duties are not efficient for two reasons.  First, it
must be recognized that efficient environmental  regulations in one country will differ from
another precisely because of differences in marginal benefits and marginal costs of abatement
(i.e., differences  in assimilative  capacity). These standards should  be determined  locally. Only
if an exporter were to purposely set standards below what was locally optimal, could the ECC
differential  be viewed as a deliberate export subsidy.  Second, existing estimates  of ECC show
11that  they are  quite  small,  and  indicate that  their  impact on  trade  patterns  is  probably
insignificant. Therefore, a tariff to adjust for ECC differentials  appears unnecessary.
If there is any role for GATT here, it would be to attempt to discern if a country's
environmental  regulations  were below those  which  are locally  optimal. Only in such  cases might
a countervailing  duty be justifiable.
Implicit in the argument for countervailing  duties is the idea that the more lenient  country
has the wrong environmental  standards. A third proposal is, therefore, that standards regarding
production pollution be harmonized internationally. As Pearson (1987) argues, this proposal
appears to be based on two misconceptions. First, international  ambient, effluent, or emissions
standards will not equalize ECC.  Therefore, coun'  s which are environmentally  scarce will
find their ECC relatively high and will still experience loss in  competitiveness.  Second,
equalizing  pollution  abatement  costs (ECC) is inefficient. As argued above, ECC should  reflect
relative assimilative capacity.  Thus we should expect both marginal benefits and costs of
abatement to differ across countries.  Equalizing standards or attempts to equalize abatement
costs would interfere with efficient  reallocation  of pollution-intensive  industries  toward countries
with relatively large environmental  endowments.
IV.  TRANSNATIONAL  POLLUTION
There are two main issues which link transnational  pollution to international  trade, and
hence to GATT.  First, are trade barriers an appropriate way to regulate (and/or diminish)
transnational pollution (e.g., acid rain)?  If so, in what way must GATT rules be revised to
allow for this?  Second, how will domestic regulations  to control transnational  pollution affect
trade patterns?
These issues also arose in  the analysis of production pollution (above), where the
damages from such pollution were within national boundaries.  Do the answers change if the
external costs generated by production cross national borders?
Baumol  and Oates (1988) address the theoretical  question of the optimal  policy response
to transnational externalities.  They argue that an internationally  optimal tax on emissions is
required:  one which is equal to the marginal damage  generated in all countries taken together.
12Given national sovereignty, however, this policy is unlikely to be implemented.  Consider
countries A, B, and C, where A is the polluter, and B and C are the victims of transnational
pollution.  A may establish an emissions tax based on marginal cost/benefit  calculations  within
its own borders.  B and C might impose tariffs equal to the marginal damage suffered by their
own nationals. The prices and allocation  of resources which result will deviate  from the optimal
outcome.  Prices in A are not directly affected by the tariffs of B and C.  Therefore, prices in
A will not fully reflect the social costs of A's production. Similarly, the duties set in B and C
will not account for the full social cost of their consumption. In all countries, prices for the
polluting good will be too low relative to the outcome with the internationally optimal tax.
Baumol and Oates conclude that there is no  set of tariffs capable of sustaining the Pareto
optimum which would be yielded by the optimal tax.
However, they then go on to explore the role for tariffs as a second-best  policy. Is there
a case for unilateral tariffs against the polluting country? Baumol and Oates argue that there
exists a "quasi-optimal"  tariff, provided the importing country is the victim of the pollution and
is large in world markets.  This tariff is one which incorporates  the costs of the damage in the
victims' country into the victims' domestic  price, and, therefore, lowers the world price of the
polluting good.  When transnational pollution exists, zero tariffs are not generally optimal.
However, the tariff which would maximize  the importing  country's welfare (given  its monopoly
power) exceeds the quasi-optimal  tariff.  Therefore, the narrow interests of the victim country
are likely to result in too high a tariff relative to the second-best  policy.
Baumol and Oates conclude that, though clearly second-best, there may be a rose for
tariffs to move the global economy towards a "quasi-optimum,"  or to be used as a threat to
achieve compliance  te an internationally  agreed upon target.
Merrifield (1989) considers the impact of unilateral action, such as a production tax or
an abatement equipment standard in one country, on the level of transnational pollution, the
terms of trade and factor rewards.  He argues that unilateral action can succeed in reducing  the
level of emissions, but that free trade in goods and in capital could cause foreign emissions to
rise sufficiently to increase the level of emissions  on net.
Some interesting empirical work has begun on the impact of regulation of transnational
pollution on trade patterns and the gains from trade.  Whalley (1991) and Whalley and Wigle
(1990), studying  carbon taxes, suggest  that interregional  gains and losses between DCs, LDCs,
13and oil exporters are highly sensitive to the type of tax implemented  to reduce emissions, but
are not insignificant  in size.  In light of the theoretical  argument above, Whalley and Wigle's
results regarding a global tax on production of greenhouse energy products are particularly
interesting.  They anticipate a terms of trade loss for the oil-exporting  region, and an overall
gain  to  the  developing non-oil exporting nations if  the  tax  revenues are  redistributed
proportionately  to population.
V.  PRODUCT STANDARDS  AS NON-TARIFF  BARRIERS
Environmentally  related product standards  (ERS)  are applied to products for the purpose
of preventing environmental  deterioration, or protecting  consumers from direct environmental
contamination (Pearson 1982).  Some common types of  ERS relate  to:  motor vehicle
emissions,  food products, product radiation emissions,  toxic substance  controls, product noise,
and packaging  requirements. Again, the main issue linking ERS with trade is the issue of inter-
country differences  in standards. In the case of production  pollution, the country with the more
stringent regulations expected a deterioration in its comparative advantage in the regulated
sectors. Here the opposite  problem arises. The country with more stringent  product regulations
will find its competitive position enhanced, as imported goods which fail to meet the local
standards  are prohibited.
In this case, two issues arise.  How can GATr  ensure that ERS are not being used as
a guise for inhibiting trade?  Is there a case for an internationally  harmonized  standard? Two
recent events illustrate the contentiousness  of these issues.  GATT has recently proposed a
"Codex  Alimentarius"  which would  internationally  harmonize  food product standards. Some  US
groups have asserted that the standards in the Codex are less stringent than FDA or  EPA
standards, and that the US should  be free to adhere to its own standards  without being accused
of being protectionist. This past year, the US imposed  a ban on export of unprocessed  logs from
US public lands in  the Pacific Northwest.  Japan contends that this export ban is a  thinly
disguised non-tariff barrier.  The ban does not meet the environmental  objective, since it does
not apply to processed wood products. It will raise the price of unprocessed  wood to Japan (the
US is the largest timber supplier to Japan) and encourage  ailing US wood processing  industries.
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There is virtually no literature which examines the conditions under which ERS can
become NTBs, nor the extent to which such NTBs have affected trade patterns. An early study
by Pearson (1982) on standards in fish and shellfish is a beginning.  Pearson suggests three
circumstances  in which  an ERS may intentionally  or unintentionally  become  an NTB. First, an
ERS may be deliberately  used as a trade barrier.  E.g.,  when imported goods are subject to
different  standards than  domestic goods;  when  the  standard does  not  meet  the  stated
environmental  objective.  The costs of these barriers are familiar.
Second, inter-country  differences  in standards  can become  an NTB when the differences
occur  for no inherent reason.  This is because they can cause foreign producers to incur extra
costs compared to domestic sellers. An example would  be the non-recognition  of an equivalent
foreign testing procedure for radiation or other emissions  standards. The foreign exporter may
incur: costs in acquiring information  on differing standards; direct costs for adaptation of the
product; loss in economies  of scale due to shorter product runs to meet different export market
standards.  Such costs may be particularly acute for developing  country sellers.
Finally, suppose the differing standards  just described exist because of different social
preferences--i.e., different assessments of the increase in  welfare due to a  more stringent
standard.  To evaluate whether this justifies a difference in standard between countries, one
should compare the marginal costs of the more stringent standard with the marginal benefits.
The assessment of costs should include the types of costs described above.  In cases where
marginal costs exceeded  marginal benefits, the more stringent standard would not be justified,
and would become  an NTB.
B.  Measuring  the Impact on Trade
No  literature exists in this area either.  Conventional assessment of NTBs seeks to
translate them into tariff-equivalents. Along these lines, Pearson makes two suggestions. One
could measure the additional.costs  incurred by the exporter to comply with different standards.
One could also measure the number and/or value of shipments  denied entry due to failure to
meet standards.  Pearson measures  the value of imports detained in fish, shellfish, fruits, and
vegetables. He finds that food ERS have a modest  impact on trade, but can be significant  for
individual  commodities.
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Unlike  the  case  of  producer pollution,  there  seem  to  be  strong  arguments for
harmonization of product standards to avoid protectionism  and to reduce the costs described
above.  The only case in which different standards appear to be economically  legitimate are
those in which the marginal benefits of incrementally  more stringent standards exceed the cost
of such standards.
The types of NTBs described  in part A suggest certain policy responses to determine if
the ERS is a disguise for protectionism. First, determine if imports are being subject to the
same standard as domestic goods.  Second,  evaluate whether the ERS meets the environmental
objective  (the Japanese  dispute with log exports), and in particular whether it meets it in a least-
cost way.  Third,  determine if differences in  national standards are  arbitrary.  This is a
particularly difficult question, since it requires countries  to agree on safe levels of emissions  of
rdiation,  air pollution from cars, etc.  On these issues the scientific community is not in
agreement (the food standards debate).  However, more stringent  ERS should not be accepted
without weighing the costs of such a policy.  It appears that public debate has focussed solely
on marginal benefits without  assessing marginal  cost.  Unlike the case of production  pollution,
it appears that implementation  of  harmonized product standards may be efficient, if  more
stringent regulations exist for no inherent reason, or if the marginal costs of more stringent
regulations  exceed the marginal benefits.
VI.  TRADE IN HAZARDOUS  SUBSTANCES
Trade in hazardous substances  is related to the issue of product standards discussed in
part V.  In this case, the question is whether the domestic environmental standards of the
exporting country should be imposed on the importing country.  E.g., if use of a pesticide is
prohibited in country A, should country A be allowed to export the product to country B?
Anecdotal evidence of potential or actual damage due to export of goods which are
domestically  prohibited or severely restricted abounds (Scherr, 1987). Most of the cases cited
16concern exports of pesticides,  pharmaceuticals,  consumer  goods  and food, and hazardous  waste.
Studies by Scherr (1987) and Azevedo (1982) survey the evolution of US regulation of such
trade.  The main issues in the US involve notice of exportation of such goods, prior informed
consent  of the importing  country, explicit  bans on drugs which are domestically  prohibited, and
procedures for alerting importing nations of the export of hazardous  substarzces.
In  1989 GATr  established a Working Group on Exports of Domestically Prohibited
Goods and Other Hazardous Substances.  Broadly spealdng, its task is to examine the trade-
related aspects of this issue not adequately addressed by other institutions.  Sankey (1989)
surveys the activity of seven other international  bodies in attempting to regulate this trade:
UNEP, FAO, WHO, ILO, UN Secretariat, UNCTC, OECD.  The main concern of these
bodies has been to provide information  on domestically  prohibited  goods (DPG) and hazardous
substances, and to establish procedures whereby export notification  is given in the exporting
country, and time and information is given for the irnporting country to make an informed
decision to import or not.
The most active of these has been the UNEP.  In 1975 it established  an International
Register of  Potentially Toxic Chemicals.  In  1987 it  adopted the London Guidelines for
Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International  Trade.  Under these guidelines, 74
countries agreed to notify each other whenever  they banned or severely restricted a chemical.
The  guidelines also  provided for  exporters to  notify  importing countries of  impending
exportation of DPG.  UNEP has also developed procedures whereby export of hazardous
substances  could only occur after informed consent of the importing country.  In 1989 UNEP
also adopted the Basel Convention  on Transboundary  Movements  of Hazardous Wastes.  This
extensive measure requires,  among other  things, States Parties to  notify the  convention
secretariat  of movement  of hazardous  waste  and sets  up procedures  of verification  and settlement
of disputes.  Also in 1989, under UNEP auspices the Montreal Protocol of Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer was established. It came into force in 1989, ratified by 36 countries
and the EC.  This requires participating states to reduce consumption  and production of such
substances.  It  also prohibits export of controlled substances to  non-party states, and the
importation  of such substances  from non-party  states.
Efforts to provide exchange of information have also been established by the FAO
regarding pesticides, the  WHO regarding pharmaceuticals and  chemical safety, the  ILO
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__regarding  occupational  safety, and the UN Secretariat. Under the WHO pharmaceutical  products
certification  scheme, the importing  country may require the exporter to provide certification  of
authorization  of sale, and certification  of compliance  with WHO production standards.
In  1984 the OECD adopted guiding principles on export of prohibited chemicals.  It
recommends that exporting countries give necessary information  to enable importers to make
informed decisions  regarding importation  of such products.
The main issue now is whether  GATr  should  introduce  its own restriction on such trade
and if so, how.  In particular, should exports only be permitted after importing countries have
given official prior informed consent? Given the arguments in the previous section, it appears
that  inter-country  differences  in standards  for these products  (assuming  access to full information
regarding the degree of hazard involved)  would only be justified if marginal benefits from less
stringent standards outweighed  marginal costs.
Vn.  REFORM OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE  RATE POLICY: THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR NATURAL RESOURCE  USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL  DEGRADATION
The recent emphasis  on reform of trade and exchange rate policy as a means to further
development  has provoked questions  concerning  the environmental  impact of such reforms.  At
the center of the debate is whether or not these reforms will lead to a  non-optimal  rate of
depletion of  natural  resources and  increased environmental degradation--i.e., a  type  of
development which is not sustainable.  For  example, devaluation and/or removal of trade
barriers will likely increase output of agricultural  exports. Would  this imply too rapid a rate of
depletion of  forests or soil?  Would this lead to overcultivation  of land?  Would this shift
production to crops which are more damaging to the environment?
Virtually no analytical  work exists in this ar,oa.  This is not surprising, for two reasons.
First, trade liberalization,  devaluation,  and accompanying  policies such as fiscal and monetary
austerity, elimination of government marketing boards in agriculture, and other policies will
undoubtedlv  have some impact on the use of natural resources and the extent of environmental
degradation. However, the type of impact  is not predictable  a priori.  Second,  even if one were
able to predict that certain trade reforms would increase the export of, say, a natural resource,
18this would  not imply that the reform should  not be made. The problems  of optimal resource use
and optimal  rate of degradation  lie in appropriately  determining  the shadow  prices of resources,
and internalizing  externalities. These are domestic  problems.  Although  certain trade policies
may help achieve such a domestic  objective, they are at best, second-best  methods  of doing so.
Most studies which discuss the issue recognize this:  Pearce and Turner (1990), Warford
(1989), Barrett (1990), Muzondo (1990), Markandya and Richardson (1990).
Markandya and Richardson (1990)  provides a detailed examination  of the way in which
specific  liberalization  policies might be expected to affect the environment. Devaluation  should
increase the producer price for export goods and for import-competing  goods, and cause
substitution  away from imported  products.  To the extent that this causes a rise in the output of
export crops, it may imply increased land clearing (increased  deforestation)  or more intensive
use of existing lands.  It may also imply changes in the use of fertilizers, pesticides, and the
choice of crop.  There may be an increase in the rate of soil erosion or increase in the incentive
to invest in land improving  equipment  or techniques. The reaction of the farmer is likely to be
heavily influenced  by the land tenure system, as this influences  the degree to which changes in
price incentives  actually affect production decisions.
Markandya  and Richardson  anticipate  that removal  of tariffs and quantitative  restrictions
give rise to  the same potential impacts as a devaluation, across a  more limited number of
products.  This is also the case for increases in official  producer prices of agricultural  products.
Simultaneous  removal of subsidies  on agricultural  inputs could result in a number of outcomes.
Removal  of pesticide subsidies,  for example, could imply use of more traditional  methods  which
are  less environmentally damaging.  However, to  the degree that they are  less effective,
productivity  falls.  To counteract this, farmers may cultivate land more intensively.
Barrett  (1990) actually attempts to  analyze how farmers'  decisions regarding soil
conservation will be affected by liberalization  policy.  He focusses on the following debate.
Suppose particular liberalization  policies  lead to a rise in farm producer prices.  Will this lead
farmers to deplete  the soil less, because they have financial  incentive  to invest in conservational
farming techniques or equipment? Or will this lead to farmers "mining the soil" for a quick
return on larger crop yields now? (The  phrase is borrowed from Lipton.) Barrett proposes the
following  maximization  problem for the farmer: choose a soil erosion program to maximize  the
present value of  a  stream of  future profits, discounted at market interest rates.  He then
19considers the reaction of the farmer to an unanticipated  permanent  increase in the price of his
crop.
The results are provocative. For exan.ple, Barrett argues that such a price increase will
have no impact on the farmer's choice of optimal soil conservation. This is because the rise in
price raises, equally, the benefits to more soil erosion now, and the benefits to adopting more
conservation  now.  He finds tha. the same result holds for the impact of the price rise on the
length  of the fallow period.  The only way the price increase will have an impact is through  its
effect  on the farmer's decision to employ non-soil  inputs. A third result regards fertilizer usage-
-used to mitigate  erosion-induced  productivity  loss. Here he finds that the optimal  conservation
decision remains unaffected  as long as the technical  rate of substitution  between soil loss due to
cultivation  and soil depth is independent  of the use of non-soil  inputs.  If this independence  does
not exist, then the conservation  decision will be affected.  However, the direction of the effect
is impossible  to determine without specific  information  on the production function.
Barrett concludes  that a rise in producer prices could improve, worsen,  or have no impact
on  soil depletion--that it depends upon the  technical details of  the agriculture production
function. He also stresses  that the concern should not be whether  or not policy  reforms conserve
or do not conserve soil.  Rather they should be: to correctly estimate the shadow  price of soil
use, given that erosion can cause harm downstream;  and to incorporate this externality  correctly
into the farmers' decision process.
Another  interesting  conclusion  can be drawn from Barrett's work. Reform  of land tenure
systems and access to rural credit markets may be a more appropriate focus for the achieving
of appropriate levels of soil erosion.  This is because Barrett does show that higher discount
rates will lower the  optimal level of  soil depth in  the  steady state.  To the  extent that
sharecropping  arrangements  and very high interest rates from moneylenders  produce  a very high
discount  rate for peasant farmers, these would tend to contribute  to higher than optimal rates of
soil depletion.
In a recent study on industrialized  country trade policies  and natural resources, Dunmore
and Langley (1988) propose that the link between trade policy and demand for agricultural
commodities  must first be estimated.  Then, the resulting  adjustments  in agricultural  production
must be assessed:  changes in types of crops planted, production techniques, relative amounts
of inputs used.  Specific assessment of these adjustments should allow for estimates of  the
e-rived  demand for  natural resources use and value, and  consequently, for the potential
20additional  damage  or benefit to the environment. As Barrett's work shows, there is considerable
uncertainty  as to the adjustments in agriculture which would result from a change in trade or
exchange rate policy, as well as their impact on the environment.
The discussion thus  far has  ignored the  non-agricultural sectors of  the  economy.
Removal of overvalued exchange rates (as a means of subsidizing  capital inputs), tariffs, and
quantitative  restrictions  is likely to imply reduced incentives  to the previously  protected  import-
competing sector.  The shrnking of some industries in this sector may imply reductions in
certain types of environmental damage.  Certainly this must also be weighed in assessing  the
overall impact of liberalization  on the health of the environment.
The study of the links between trade liberalization  and environmental  damage will be
valuable if it pinpoints specific external costs which will be aggravated by liberalization. This
may be  useful  in  determining the  optimal domestic policy  (or  policies) to  reduce the
environmental  damage to the appropriate  level.  It may also indicate necessary  reforms in land
tenure and credit availability (particularly rural credit) which will be critical in  efficiently
internalizing  the costs of these externalities. However, as trade barriers are an inefficient  means
of achieving  a domestic goal, it is doubtful that such a study would lend support to limitation
of liberalization  due to its environmental  impact. A case for more gradual removal of barriers
would need to be based on estimates  of the welfare costs of maintaining  trade restrictions vs.
the gains from delaying environmental  damage.
VIII.  CONCLUSION
This paper has reviewed  the existing  literature on the impact  of environmental  regulation
on trade, and the impact of trade policy on the environment. What are the conclusions  which
can be drawn regarding changes in  trade policy and GATT, in  light of concern for the
environment? On what issues does further work appear necessary?
Inter-Country  Differences in Environmental  Regulation  of Production Pollution
More stringent  regulations  in one country  are thought  to result in loss of competitiveness,
21and perhaps industrial flight and the development of pollution havens.  The many empirical
studies  which have attempted  to test these hypotheses  have shown no evidence to support them.
There may be room here for better estimates  of actual environmental  control costs incurred by
firms, and estimates  by industry  of actual losses in output due to these costs.  It is doubtful that
this would yield a  significant impact on trade patterns.  However, it might provide useful
information  on individual sectors where adjustment may be significant.
There is no role here for countervailing  duties  or an international  environmental  standard.
Both concepts  ignore the necessary  reallocation  of resources that must occur if externalities  are
to be efficiently  incorporated  into costs. Both also ignore the fact that standards  should  be based
on local calculations  of marginal costs and benefits. Only if an exporter's standards  are below
what is locally optimal, could a countervailing  duty be justified.
Subsidies are  likely to  be guises for trade barriers,  and should in  general not be
accommodated.  They are  usually not an efficient means of  achieving an environmental
objective.  In addition, they may hinder the efficient reallocation of  resources away from
pollution-intensive  industries.
Transnational  Pollution
When pollution spills over national boundaries, there may be a role for tariffs to move
the global economy  towards an optimal  allocation of resources. However, the tariff will at best
be second-best. If it is based on damage to the victim country alone, it will not reduce trade in
the polluting  product enough. If the tariff is one which maximizes  the welfare of the victim, it
may reduce trade in the product by too much.
Empirical work thus far suggests that unilateral domestic ;alicy  may be ineffective  at
reducing global emissions, and that a type of global tax may have significant  effects on trade
patterns.  Further empirical work on the effectiveness  of various policies and their implications
for trade patterns would be useful.
Product Standards as Non-Tariff Barriers
Unlike the case of production pollution, more stringent regulations here are likely to
22result in gains in competitiveness  for domestic industry, as the regulation becomes  a barrier to
trade. Again, unlike  the case  of production  pollution, there appears to be a case for establishing
some international  code of product standards, to prevent the use of standards as NTBs.  This
would require discerning whether a standard meets the objective, and whether differences in
standards exist for no inherent reason.  If disagreement  exists in the scientific  community over
the additional benefits of more stringent standards, it is important to weigh these against the
additional costs they generate.  This suggests  the importance  of more empirical  work assessing
the restrictive impact ("tariff-equivalent")  of more stringent  regulations  on trade in the affected
products.
Trade in Hazardous Substances
Many international institutions have set up  guidelines for their members to  follow
regarding export of these products.  Particular emphasis  has been placed on informed consent
on the part of the importing nation. To the extent that this is simply  a special case of the debate
on differences in product standards, the suggestions  in the preceding section should apply here
as well.
Reform of Trade and Exchange Rate Policy: the Implications  for Natural Resource  Use and
Environmental  Degradation
Little work  has  been done to  assess the  impact of  liberalization policies on  the
environment, largely because the links are indirect and the outcomes  in many cases ambiguous.
Furthermore, trade barriers will be, at best, a second-best  means of reducing environmental
damage.  However, empirical work linking changes in trade and exchange rate policy to the
environment  would be useful  to:  pinpoint  the environmental  damage  likely to be aggravated  by
the policy change; perhaps speed up the process of implementing  an efficient domestic policy
to incorporate  this damage  into production  costs; and illuminate  other areas where  policy change
may be required to effectively reduce damage, such as land tenure and rural credit systems.
Any case for more gradual liberalization  of policy would need to be based on estimates  of the
costs of maintaining  barriers versus the benefits of delayed  environmental  damage.
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